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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we pretend to identify the existing differences between contractual conditions fixed 
by franchisors of Spanish chains. With this objective, we analyze the two basic types of existing 
franchised chains –those that commercialize services and those others that distribute products- 
and if contractual stipulations and other characteristics differ in a systematic manner between 
them.  In this sense, we have considered a series of independent variables such as size, age, initial 
fee, royalties or contractual initial duration. After undergoing the descriptive analysis of these 
variables for our sample -440 Spanish franchised chains- we have divided the latter into two 
groups –based on the type of chain- in order to detect significant differences between them. For 
this aim, we have conducted a discriminant analysis to discover which of the independent 
variables taken into account contribute, in a significant manner, to a correct classification of 
chains to their corresponding group –service or product chains-. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n concise terms, a franchise contract consists in a commercial collaboration system in which the 
franchisor –the owner of the chain- gives the franchisee the right to exploit a license or a recognized or 
successful brand name, to receive technical assistance and initial and on-going training, advertising 
support, etc. In exchange, the franchisee must undergo the necessary initial investments in his unit, pay the initial 
franchise fee and the periodical fees –royalty and advertising fees-, respect and apply the operating and commercial 
policies established by the franchisor, etc. 
 
Franchising constitutes a hybrid organizational form, because it possesses both characteristics of hierarchy 
and the market. In this sense, as in hierarchy, the franchisor maintains a significant part of the control over the 
system through contractual provisions that the franchisee must comply with (opening and closing hours, regulation 
of the products and services that can and cannot be sold through each unit, presentation and decoration of the store, 
etc.). Nevertheless, it differs from hierarchy, and therefore, is closer to the market solution in that it allows for 
certain franchisee independence to decide over certain aspects that surely have a significant influence over his outlet. 
 
The nature of residual rent distribution between parties is significantly different from that that would exist 
in the case of a totally decentralized system. In this sense, most franchise contracts include the payment of royalties 
for the franchisee, usually calculated as a percentage of unit sales, other on-going payments in exchange for certain 
services provided by the franchisor and the existence of an initial franchise entry fee. Moreover, the contract may 
obligate the franchisee to make purchases of certain critical inputs or raw materials from the franchisor or from 
authorised suppliers and usually contemplates the obligation for the owner of the chain to provide assistance and 
operating support to franchisees. 
 
From another point of view, the existence of franchising has been justified through different, sometimes 
confronting, theories. First, it has been highlighted that the value of franchising is due to the capacity of franchisees 
of supplying scarce resources for the franchisor in the short term (Ozanne & Hunt, 1971; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1968-
1969; Caves & Murphy, 1976; Minkler, 1990, Norton, 1988). This would mean that reasons for franchising are only 
I 
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transitory because such shortages would disappear with time, so chains will franchise less with maturity and will, 
ultimately, be integrated only by franchisor-owned units. 
 
Another view justifies the election of the franchisor to franchise based on agency considerations 
(Mathewson & Winter, 1985; Brickley & Dark, 1987; Norton, 1988; Lal, 1990). The franchisee gives solution to the 
incentive problem present in the case in which chain units are directed by employed managers and, therefore, this 
option reduces supervision and control costs. This will be especially relevant as geographical dispersion and 
importance of local agent effort increase (Lafontaine, 1992; Shane, 1996). As franchisor skills and knowledge 
increases, he will more effectively design incentive and compensation systems in order to control managers of his 
own stores and, therefore, franchising will be reduced. 
 
Other authors have arrived at the opposite conclusion. They state that of is not he percentage of franchised 
establishments, but the percentage of franchisor-owned stores that decreases with chain maturity. In initial stages of 
chain life, the franchisor opens more directly-owned stores to signal his compromise to potential franchisees of 
protecting brand name value (Scott, 1995; Gallini & Lutz, 1992; Lafontaine, 1993). 
 
Nevertheless, recent studies consider that dual distribution or the so called “plural form” is a deliberate and 
stable strategy that entails important synergetic effects (Bradach, 1997; Lewin, 1997; Bai & Tao, 2000; Sorenson & 
Sorensen, 2001; Pénard et. al, 2002; Seshadri, 2002). Related to this, Lafontaine & Shaw (2001) find that the 
proportion of franchisor-owned establishments is reduced in the first years of chain life-cycle and that, later on, it 
stabilizes around a certain percentage that varies from sector to sector and, moreover, from chain to chain. 
 
There are common factors to all franchise contracts, but relevant differences also exist. For example, 
royalty fees, usually fixed as a percentage of unit sales, constitute one of the most important differing stipulations to 
the point that they are not even employed in some activities (Lal, 1990). If we take a look at the available annual 
franchise guidebooks, it is straightforward that there are relevant variations in their quantity. In this sense, the 
objective of the present paper is to determine if significant differences exist in contractual stipulations established by 
franchisors of Spanish chains, within these, royalty percentages are a key condition. 
 
It is worth highlighting that contractual conditions are identical for all franchisees that join a given chain in 
a particular point of time. In spite of this, changing contractual terms, for a given chain, from one time period to 
another must be taken into account
1
. 
 
Including a royalty rate in the franchise contract helps to align both parties´ objectives, because both the 
franchisor and the franchisee will seek sales maximization (Lal, 1990; Bergen et. Al., 1992; Bhattacharyya & 
Lafontaine, 1995). Because high royalties will supply franchisors with powerful incentives to control for and 
supervise activities to maintain and develop brand name value –therefore, we should expect royalties to be higher in 
the case of service chains compared to that of product distribution activities-, but will reduce franchisee motivation 
to be efficient, ownership of some units by the franchisor can constitute another manner of signalling his 
compromise with quality control. Even if horizontal free-riding hazards were eliminated, the existence of royalties 
would be necessary to motivate the franchisor to undergo the necessary investments in brand name
2
 (advertising, 
                                                          
1 The evolution of economic contractual conditions is not analyzed in this paper, but will be treated in a future study once we have concluded data 
collection for the eight year period 1996-2003. 
2 Because royalty payments depend, usually, on gross sales, the franchisor signals his compromise to be diligent through making the necessary 
investment in brand name and detecting possible franchisee opportunistic behaviour. If a given franchisee decides to reduce product and/or 
service quality, his sales could be reduced. But, he would also have a subsequent reduction in his costs, with what he would still obtain “normal 
profits”. Part of the consequences of his opportunistic behaviour would be spread among the rest of the franchisees and the franchisor of the chain 
(the latter has incentives to prevent this type of situation, because his earnings depend on franchisees units sales).  
Instead, if royalty fees were related to franchisee profits, the franchisor would receive the same earnings even if the franchisee is a free-rider. So, 
in this case, he would not have the proper incentives to supervise franchisee behaviour. Related to this Rubin (1978) establishes that if royalties 
are tied to profits, the franchisor would not be signalling his compromise of being diligent. Whereas, if they depend on gross sales, he would be 
affected through reduced payments received for this concept and would be motivated towards detecting reduced quality (Rubin, 1978; Lal, 1990). 
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franchisee selection and control, etc.). Due to the fact that neither the level of service supplied by the franchisee or 
franchisor´ specific investments can be totally contemplated in a contract, and because they are not easily observed, 
parties have incentives to act in an opportunistic manner. 
 
The franchisor has an important paper in reducing franchisee opportunism or free riding –because the latter 
may try to reduce quality standards to decrease his corresponding costs (in a greater quantity than reductions 
suffered in sales) and this will have a negative effect over all units of the chain- and in providing other services, like 
advertising, that can be undergone more efficiently if they are centralized. It is observed that in order to extract rents 
form franchisees they rely more on royalties than on high initial fees (Rubin, 1978; Seaton, 2003). 
 
In another order of things, the presence of an adequate proportion of franchisor-owned establishments can 
also contribute to the reduction of differences in quality supplied through multiple units. Uniformity is, in this sense, 
one of the key characteristics of chain success and units owned by the franchisor can help to enhance it through 
reduction of franchisee opportunism. Therefore, we will probably a negative relation between royalty intensity –
quantity- and the proportion of franchisor-owned units because both work towards reducing incomplete and 
asymmetrical informational hazards (Pénard et. Al, 2003). 
 
Related to the above, various studies have found that there is a negative relation between the importance of 
franchisee effort and the proportion of units owned by the franchisor (Norton, 1988; Lafontaine, 1992; Shepard, 
1993; Slade, 1996; Lafontaine & Slade, 1997). This is to say that when control and supervision of effort becomes 
specially difficult or costly, as in activities labour intensive activities, the franchisor relies on high-powered 
incentives and prefers to share the residual rent with the agent (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Minkler, 1990; Scott, 1995).  
Therefore, because service chains need for increased effort from the local agent, we expect to find that franchising is 
widespread and this will reduce the proportion of franchisor-owned units compared to product distribution chains. 
 
Based on the above, the objective of this paper is twofold. First, the descriptive analysis of contractual 
conditions fixed by Spanish franchised chains. With this aim, we have employed data supplied by annual 
guidebooks for the year 2002. Second, from a static point of view, we conduct a discriminant analysis to shear some 
light on how contractual stipulations vary with chain activity in Spain. More specifically, if significant differences 
exist between terms established by franchisors whose activity consists in commercializing services and those that 
distribute products they manufacture themselves. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we identify and describe the variables taken into 
account and we try to anticipate the sign or expected relation with each type of chain. Secondly, we refer to data 
collection and methodology employed and, in the next section, we present the results obtained. Lastly, we make 
reference to the mayor conclusions. 
 
KEY VARIABLES 
 
Royalty rate (ROY) 
 
This variable represents the periodic payments –usually depending on gross sales- that franchisees must 
make to franchisor. It is measured as the percentage established in the franchise contract. We include in this rate the 
percentage of advertising fees that the franchisee must also supply to the chain owner because, in many cases, one 
rate in included in the other. 
 
As in other studies, a small proportion of the chains in the sample did not establish royalty fees as a 
percentage of sales. Royalty payments in these cases were established as a fixed periodical sum. Theses 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Nevertheless, Tikoo & Nair (1999) highlight that even though the above is true; it gives rise to another problem. So, they propose variable royalty 
rates because while franchisors are interested in maximizing all units’ sales, franchisees really seek maximizing their surplus. Therefore, 
franchisees will only be motivated towards increasing their sales when marginal sales exceed marginal costs (when both become equal, the 
optimum point is reached and if marginal profit becomes negative, franchisor and franchisee objectives are in conflict ) (Spinelli & Birley, 1996; 
Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995). 
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observations, as in Brickley (2002) were eliminated from the sample –finally, we obtained 440 valid Spanish chains.  
Royalty fees are obligated for all franchisees of the chain and, therefore, constitute an important portion of 
franchisor remuneration. These payments compensate the latter for the investments made in developing brand name 
value, supporting and training franchisees, supervising them, etc. it is for this reason that we expect to find that 
royalty rates are greater in chains that are dedicated, more intensively, to the commercialization of services. In this 
case, it seems straightforward that initial transmission of franchisor intangible assets to franchisee and monitoring 
needs are greater. 
 
Age; number of years franchising (YF) and number of initial years without franchising (YNOTF) 
 
The number of years franchising is defined as the period of time, measured in years, between the year the 
chain was established –the year the first franchised unit was opened- and the present year –in this case, 2002-. This 
time period is commonly used as a proxy for chain experience. In this sense, greater experience may permit easier 
access to scarce resources for the franchisor or can reflect chain reputation value. We expect to find that the number 
of years franchising is greater in service chains, given that that this type of activities demand more franchisor 
experience and skills to transfer know how and other intangibles to franchisee and, also, to monitor them efficiently. 
 
The number of years without franchising –period of time, in years, between the year the enterprise was 
established and the year the first franchised unit was opened- is employed as a proxy to measure franchisor 
difficulties in developing an adequate franchising package. Moreover, chains with a higher value for this variable 
should present a smaller number of franchised units because during the initial period without franchising, centralized 
organizational and control systems are installed; this is, at least in Spain, a feature difficult to change. 
 
We expect that the value of years without franchising to be higher in service chains because it can reflect 
brand name value (Lafontaine, 1992; Lafontaine & Shaw, 2001; Pénard et. Al. 2002), franchisor skills to select 
franchisees or time needed to develop and complete franchise package. 
 
Size of the chain (SIZE) 
 
Chain size is measured as the total number of units of the chain –franchised and franchisor-owned-. The 
value of this variable should be superior in product distribution chains because in service chains expansion can be 
slowed due to higher monitoring and uniformity problems. As a consequence, previous studies have stated that chain 
size presents a very high positive correlation with geographical dispersion and, therefore, can be used as a proxy for 
supervision costs (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Lafontaine & Slade, 2001). 
 
Initial complementary investment –total investment minus initial entry fee- (INV) 
 
This variable represents the initial complementary investment the franchisee must make in order to join the 
chain –total initial investment minus initial entry fee. 
 
Basically, it is the sum of costs of adapting store premises to franchisor stipulations. We expect the value to 
be higher for service chains because in this type of activities a relevant portion of “production” must be made locally 
–for example, in the case of restaurants-. 
 
Initial entry fee (CAN) 
 
The initial entry fee the franchisee must support to join the chain is justified through the existence of a 
successful and proven bran name, the right to receive operating assistance from the franchisor, the transfer of know 
how from the franchisor, etc. 
 
It has been established that this fee and royalties constitute alternative manners of extracting rents or 
surplus from franchisees in order to prevent the latter to obtain extraordinary profits (Blair & Kaserman, 1982; 
Kaufmann & Dant, 2001). So, we should find a negative relation between both variables. 
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Nevertheless, other studies have found a positive relation between CAN and ROY. For example, 
Mathewson & Winter (1985) established that lower entry fees correspond to chains that also fix lower royalty rates 
and that this was a common practice among chains that are merged in initial phases of their life cycle, –this is, 
chains with lower brand name value-. Related to this, Lafontaine & Kaufmann (1994) found that both variables 
offered the same evolution patterns over time. They justified their finding stating that these fees correspond to 
different remuneration concepts. This way, while the entry fee is applied by the franchisor to recover initial selection 
and training costs, royalty fees are used to pay for brand name value and on-going support given to franchisees, so 
we may find a positive correlation between both (Lafontaine, 1992; Lafontaine & Shaw, 1999). 
 
We should expect CAN to be higher the higher the importance of intangible assets transfer to franchisees 
and this takes place in service chains. 
 
Contract duration (DUR) 
 
This variable reflects the initial duration, provided in the contract, for the relation between franchisor and 
franchisee.  Shorter contract duration will reduce the number of potential franchisees willing to join the chain and, 
therefore, increase the proportion of franchisor-owned units. Moreover, longer durations will probably lead to lower 
royalty rates because as the franchisor has more experience, he usually will prefer to extract rents from franchisees 
through longer contract periods instead of employing higher royalty rates (Pénard et. Al. 2002). 
 
We expect duration to be longer in service chains in order to permit franchisees to more easily recover 
initial investments made. 
 
Proportion of franchisor-owned units (%PROP) 
 
We obtain the values of this variable by dividing the number of franchisor-owned units into the total 
number of establishments of the chain. Although it is not a contractual stipulation, we consider it is a key variable in 
the design of any franchise chain. 
 
The proportion of units owned by the franchisor will be, quite surely, higher in product distribution chains 
because the importance of local agent effort is lower in this type of activities. Moreover, as in Pénard et. al. (2002), 
we will also consider the relation between this variable and royalty rates. Both of them work towards the reduction 
of contractual hazards that arise due to incomplete and asymmetrical information situations. This may mean that 
both constitute alternative mechanisms in organizational design of franchise chains –negative relation-. Commonly, 
most papers that have studied franchise contractual conditions (Lafontaine, 1992; Lafontaine & Shaw, 1999; 
Bercovitz, 2000, Scott, 1995) have not gone deeply into the relation between royalties and the so-called “dual or 
plural distribution”. 
 
After the descriptive analysis of the previous variables for the total sample, we divided it into two groups 
based on chain type. For this purpose, we introduced a dummy variable -TYPE- that is equal to zero when chain 
activity consists in commercializing services and equal to one if it entails the distribution of products manufactured 
centrally by the franchisor. The ultimate aim of this classification is to analyze the possible existence of significant 
differences in contractual stipulations and in the proportion of franchisor-owned units between both groups. 
 
DATA 
 
Due to the non existence of a ready to use dada base related to franchising in Spain, data employed has 
been collected, in collaboration with a working group of the University of Oviedo (Spain)
3
, from the annual 
franchise guidebooks published. We have drawn data from Tormo & Asociados, Barbadillo & Asociados, Franchisa 
and Asociación Española de Franquiciadores. 
 
                                                          
3 We specially thank Prof. Manuel González and Prof. Begoña López for their help. 
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The final specific sample used is integrated by Spanish chains that had, at least, one establishment in 2002. 
This was the analyzed and guidebooks contained references for more than 1500 Spanish chains. In many cases, 
sufficient data was not available, so they were not taken into account. Finally, the sample is composed by 440 
chains. 
 
Related to data collection, we must make reference to important incongruent information between 
guidebooks. In this sense, in some cases, for the same year and variable, guidebooks contained very different values. 
To give solution to this problem we contacted with the franchisor, on the telephone or web page with the aim of 
reflecting the true value of the variable. Nevertheless, when this was not possible we took the value proportioned by 
Tormo & Asociados because this guidebook had resulted, in other occasions, that it was the most accurate. 
 
In some cases, data for some variables was available in interval terms. In these cases, franchisors reported a 
maximum and minimum because exact numerical value depended on other circumstances like unit location or 
dimension, so we introduced the average of the variable.  
 
Chains finally selected belong to all the different sectors of activity that are present in franchising activities. 
It is worth mentioning that each annual guidebook includes around 60 different activities. Given the size of the 
sample, we chose to regroup these activities into 14 larger sectors n such a way that each one corresponds, 
unequivocally, to service or product distribution chains. Controlling for sector differences is to be done in a future, 
more complete, contribution. In this sense sectors belonging to “product chains” (TYPE =1) are: cosmetics and 
dietetic products, furniture and house clothing, computers and accessories, clothing, shoes and accessories, 
specialized products and various products. In the same line “service chains” (TYPE=0) include bars and restaurants, 
fast food, photograph and optic, real-estate agency and consulting services, personal health and fitness, specialized 
services and telephone and communications. This classification was taken into account both in the descriptive and 
discriminant analysis. 
 
RESULTS 
 
First, Table 1 summarizes the basic descriptive analysis of all variables used (minimum, maximum, mean 
and standard deviation). It can be observed that franchising in Spain is a fairly new activity because chains have 
been franchising an average of 6.18 years. There are two notable exceptions to this: YF is 82 –maximum value- and 
71 for two distribution chains. Another fifty chains have started to franchise in 2002, so a zero value is reflected for 
this variable in these cases. 
 
As for YNOTF, at average chains in the sample have initially stayed 8.67 years without franchising, one 
hundred and two started franchising from the very moment of firm establishment and one chain –a chocolate 
producer- waited 170 years to start to open franchised units. 
 
 
 Min. Max. Mean Stand. Desv. 
YF 0 82 6,18 7,16 
YNOTF 0 170 8,67 17,21 
SIZE 1 2449 54,31 156,89 
% PROP ,000 1,00 ,328 ,288 
INV ,00 1896193,19 89610,82 133726,77 
CAN ,00 300506,05 12951,51 18718,18 
DUR 1 15 6,79 2,63 
ROY ,00 ,60 ,04 ,05 
Table 1: Basic descriptive analysis of variables for the total sample (N=440) 
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Spanish chains are relatively small or medium sized given that they have a mean value for SIZE of 54 units. 
Ten chains only have one unit and DIA-PREKO –a widely spread supermarket- has 2449. 
 
As for the percentage of franchisor-owned units (%PROP), the average value is near 33%. Nevertheless, for 
those chains that only have one or few units that are franchisor-owned -eighteen- %PROP reaches its maximum 
value. There are also fourteen chains integrated exclusively by franchised establishments. 
 
With reference to the economic stipulations of franchise contracts, initial entry fee (CAN) is at average of 
12951 euros. It is worth noting that in Spain for 117 chains this payment did not exist –this supposes 26% of the 
sample-.  Again, the highest value for this variable was for DIA-PREKO –around 300500 euros-. 
 
The mean value for the complementary or additional investment required to join the chain (INV) is 89610 
euros. In the sample, thirteen chains did not entail any additional investment while for By Print –a franchise chain in 
the digital print activity- requires franchisees to undergo the highest investments in equipment and store –nearly 
1900000 euros-. 
 
Contract duration (DUR) never is superior to 15 years. The average value is 6.8 years but some chains only 
fix an initial duration of 1 year. We must take into account that most chains offer periodical renovations once initial 
duration is completed. 
 
The existence of royalties is not contemplated in 117 chains. The maximum value is 60% even though the 
mean value is 4%. 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive analysis of variable once we have separated total sample in two groups- service 
and product chains.  Basically, we can observe that dispersion has been reduced for most variables. Moreover, mean 
values for YF, YNOTF, SIZE and %PROP are higher for product distribution chains compared to service chains. 
The opposite occurs for INV, CAN, DUR and ROY. Nevertheless these differences, as we will see below, are not 
always significant from a statistical perspective. 
 
Next, we perform a means difference test, based on Wilks´ Lambda value, to discover which variables are 
best at differentiating service from product chains. In this sense, the values of some variables are statistically 
different for one type of chains compared to the other. 
 
This way, test shown in Table 3 establishes that DUR, ROY, PROP and YF are significant at 1%. 
Therefore, we can say that service chains establish a higher rate for periodical payments to franchisors compared to 
that of product distribution chains. This is consistent with the idea that the first type of activities entail more 
important transfers of intangibles assets from franchisor to franchisees and that this also leads to greater needs of on-
going support and training. This mayor intensity of these franchisor activities is compensated through increased 
periodical payments. 
 
Initial duration fixed in the contract for party relation is also systematically higher in service chains. It 
seems franchisees need longer time periods to recover high initial investment –complementary investment and entry 
fee- associated with service chains. Another possible explication to why service chains establish longer duration 
periods is that this reduces adverse selection hazards for the franchisor. Although CAN is not found to be 
statistically different in this analysis, the additional initial investment –INV- is, at average, higher in service chains, 
as was expected. 
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TYPE: 0 
SERVICE 
CHAINS 
(N=249) 
Variable Min. Max. Mean Stand. Desv. 
YF 0 33 5,09 5,088 
YNOTF 0 92 7,63 14,02 
SIZE 1 1040 50,33 124,47 
% PROP ,000 1,000 ,289 ,262 
INV ,0 1896193,20 104664,33 162909,22 
CAN ,00 180303,63 14866,22 14710,93 
DUR 1 15 7,37 2,77 
ROY ,00 ,60 ,050 ,056 
TYPE: 1 
PRODUCT 
CHAINS 
(N=191) 
YF 0 82 7,59 8,99 
YNOTF 0 170 10,02 20,60 
SIZE 1 2449 59,46 191,11 
% PROP ,000 1,000 ,377 ,313 
INV ,0 633370,6 69986,09 77419,26 
CAN ,00 300506,05 10586,27 22532,74 
DUR 1 10 6,02 2,22 
ROY ,00 ,38 ,026 ,04 
Table 2: Basic descriptive analysis of variables for service chains (N=249) 
and product distribution chains (N=191) 
 
 
Another significant variable is shown to be %PROP. Service chains choose to grow through more 
franchised units. Therefore, the proportion of franchisor-owned establishments is smaller in this type of activities. 
This is probably due to increased incentive and effort hazards present in the commercialization of services, where 
the importance of local agent effort is a key factor of success. On the other hand, product distribution chains can rely 
more intensely on units owned by the franchisor to grow, because uniformity and quality –two aspects positively 
related to agent effort- is less important at a local level given that production is done centrally. 
 
 
 Wilks Lambda F Sig. 
YF ,975 5,942 ,010 
YNOTF 1,000 ,028 ,868 
SIZE ,997 ,746 ,389 
INV ,980 4,607 ,033 
% PROP ,970 7,063 ,008 
CAN ,996 ,880 ,349 
DUR ,932 16,684 ,000 
ROY ,888 29,008 ,000 
Table 3: Means Differences between both groups 
A negative relation seems to exist between the proportion of franchisor-owned units and established royalty 
rates and this is consistent with the idea that both constitute alternative mechanisms to monitor franchisees. 
 
YF also results significant and is higher for product distribution chains, contrary to what we expected. The 
remaining variables do not present significant different value for the two types of activities. 
 
Below, we present results for discriminant analysis through a stepwise estimation –this process estimates 
the discriminant function by entering the independent variables sequentially according to the discriminatory power 
they add-. 
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Step Introduced 
Tolerance 
F Sig. 
1 ROY ,888 29,008 ,000 
2 % PROP ,850 20,193 ,000 
3 DUR ,809 18,001 ,000 
4 YF ,790 15,123 ,000 
Table 4: Variables introduced in each step of discriminant analysis 
 
 
As displayed in Table 4, the first variable to be entered is ROY because it contributes, in a greater extent, to 
explain dependent variable. In next steps, %PROP, DUR and YF are included. These four independent variables are 
significant in discriminating between groups. 
 
Tolerance, that represents the variation in the corresponding independent variables not explained by the 
variables already included in the model, are relatively high. This can be used to estimate multicollinearity problems, 
which in this case, are reduced. The rest of the results are presented through Table 5 to Table 8. As observed, the 
model classifies adequately the 68.4% of total cases of the sample. 
Function Eigenvalue 
% of 
variance 
Canonical 
correlation 
Wilks´ 
Lamba 
Chi-square Sig. 
1 ,266 100,0 ,459 ,790 53,864 ,000 
Table 5: Discriminant analysis results 
 
 
Function 
1 
YF -,348 
% PROP -,634 
DUR ,519 
ROY ,590 
Table 6: Standardized coefficients for canonical discriminant function 
 
  
Function 
1 
ROY ,688 
DUR ,522 
% PROP -,339 
YF -,311 
SIZE(a) -,190 
INV(a) ,085 
CAN(a) ,050 
YNOTF(a) ,002 
Table 7: Correlations between discriminating variables and typified canonical discriminant functions 
(a) This variable in not used in the analysis. 
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TYPE 
Predicted group membership Total 
0 1  
Original 
Actual group 
 
0 167 82 249 
1 57 134 191 
% 
 
0 67,1(a) 32,9 100,0 
1 29,8 70,2(a) 100,0 
Table 8: Final classification matrix 
(a) The function classifies 68.4% of chains correctly 
 
 
From the information given above, we can say that service chains entail larger royalty payments from 
franchisees, fix longer initial duration periods, present a lower proportion of franchisor-owned units and, at average, 
have been franchising for less time compared to product distribution chains. This last finding is contrary to what was 
initially expected because it is supposed that the more important the transfer of intangible assets to franchisees and 
the more monitoring difficulties, the larger the value of YF. 
 
Form another point of view, we must make reference to the fact of variables, which in other studies were 
clearly significant, did not prove to be so here –SIZE, CAN, YNOTF and INV-. Related to SIZE, is seems that 
increased complexity in design, supervision and control of the system does not influence growth possibilities 
because both types of chains reach a comparable number of units.  
 
More surprisingly, the initial franchise entry fee -CAN- is not significantly different between groups, so we 
cannot say that service chains charge larger CAN compared of that established by product chains. The same can be 
said for the complementary initial investments –even though, this variable was significant at a level of 0.05 in the 
means difference test-.   
 
Years without franchising –YNOTF- does not supply relevant discriminating power either. This is contrary 
to our expectations and indicates that the franchisor does not find greater difficulties to develop the franchise 
package in the case of service activities. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE EXTENSIONS 
 
In this paper, we have intended to identify the existing differences in contractual stipulations and other 
chain characteristics between the two basic types of chains. 
 
Contractual theories and resource based theory highlight relevant differences in these conditions as a 
function of the nature of chain basic activity, this is, between service and product distribution chains. To apply this 
to Spanish chains, we have conducted a means difference test and a stepwise discriminant analysis. The latter 
correctly classified over a 68% of the total sample -440 chains-. 
 
Findings include that royalty percentages –ROY-constitute the most discriminating variable between 
groups and are significantly higher in service chains. 
 
In the next step, the variable entered in the discriminant function was %PROP, with what we can say that 
service chains use more franchised units and less franchisor-owned units compared to product chains. The 
importance of agent effort and monitoring hazards associated with activities that employ, more intensively, labour 
leads the franchisor to rely on surplus sharing with local agent. 
 
The variable entered in step 3 is contractual duration. DUR is longer in service chains and this permits, on 
one hand, easier investment recovery for franchisee, and on the other, reduced adverse selection hazards for the 
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franchisor.  Once the franchisee has joined the chain, to extract rents to recover higher intangible investments 
through longer relations. 
 
Another relevant finding is that royalty rates and the proportion of franchisor-owned units seem to present a 
certain substitute relation. In this sense, when one is higher the other is lower and this indicates that they may be 
alternative incentive and monitoring mechanisms. 
 
The last variable that significantly discriminates between both types of chains is the number of years 
franchising –YF-. Service chains appear to start franchising activities later compared to product distribution chains, 
but once they start they employ it more intensively. 
 
Lastly, we must make reference to our future intention of extending the present study to include the 
evolution pattern of these variables over a given period of time. In this sense, with panel data, we could analyze 
interaction between key variables for each chain in the period taken into account. With this aim, we have just 
concluded the data collection phase for the eight year period from 1996 to 2003 and we are completing this 
information with other financial values not included in annual guidebooks. The necessity of controlling for 
differences within each type of activity –service and product chains- will also be taken into account. 
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